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ECJ Review of Member State Measures for Compliance with Fundamental
Rights
John J. Barceló III∗
Introduction
This essay explores the avenues through which a European-level system of fundamental
rights might be effectively enforced against EU Member State measures. The parallel concept in
the U.S. occurred when, starting in 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court began ruling that different
distinct guarantees in the Federal Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution controlled State
government measures. In the EU, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) could conceivably
follow a similar line of development within the EU system, or, on the other hand, the European
Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) could play that role. This essay explores these options and
suggests that either one or the other is likely to emerge at some point in the future in a role
equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court as the guardian of fundamental rights for all EU citizens,
articulated and enforced (even against Member State measures) at the European level.
Fundamental Rights as General Principles of EU Law
The development of fundamental rights law within the EU legal system1 has followed a
captivating trajectory. The imperatives that motivated the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to
discover an unwritten system of fundamental rights law embedded in the general principles of
EU law are well known. Once the ECJ had ruled that parts of the EC Treaty, to some extent
Directives, and of course Regulations had direct effect and were supreme within the Member
State judicial orders, it became necessary for the ECJ to find the power to review the EU’s
secondary law measures for conformity with fundamental rights law. Otherwise the Member
States would be asked to subordinate their national legal rules to superior EU law, untested and
uncontrolled by fundamental rights principles. Either the ECJ would have to perform such a
review or the Member State constitutional courts would do so and would thus destroy EU law
uniformity and harmony.
As is well known the ECJ took the first option and gave itself the role of a judicial review
court controlling EU secondary law for conformity with fundamental rights law. The ECJ
discovered the content of that law in general principles of EU law deriving from the
constitutional traditions of the Member States and the European Convention for the Protection of
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). This development took a logical step
forward when the ECJ decided that Member State measures enacted to implement EU Directives,
or otherwise compelled by EU law, also could be reviewed by the ECJ for conformity with
fundamental rights.2 The step was logical because in complying with their legal obligation to
implement EU Directives or other measures, the Member State legislatures or officials were in
essence functioning merely as agents of the EU legal order, forced to act by the command of EU
law.
The ERT Case and Its Potential
In the momentous ERT decision in 1991,3 however, the ECJ took a step that was not truly
compelled by the imperatives of a supreme and harmonious legal order guaranteeing an
integrated internal market. Instead it was a step in the direction of a more broadly conceived
political integration movement that held out the potential of a common fundamental rights order
at the EU level binding on all Member States and enforced by directly effective rulings of the
ECJ.
The theory of the ERT judgment was—on its own facts—a striking decision, but its
potential was (and remains) even more striking. The theory involves two distinct analytical
stages. The first, “triggering,” stage arises whenever a Member State measure in principle
infringes one of the four market freedoms (goods, services, persons, capital). If a complainant
challenges such a Member State measure, then the Member State has the burden of showing that
its measure is nevertheless justified under the ECJ’s proportionality analysis. That analysis aims
at ensuring that the Member State measure in question serves a legitimate public regulatory
purpose and that it does not overly burden intra-Community commerce.4 The second analytical
stage, which then follows, is truly innovative. The ERT decision holds that the Member State
must also show that its commerce burdening measure is consistent with EU fundamental rights
law. Why? Because that law is part of the general principles of EU law and more or less gets
carried along on the “coat-tails” of the proportionality analysis—a bold line of reasoning. The
ECJ could easily have limited its analysis to applying the free-market-preserving concepts of
proportionally and left any issues of fundamental rights review to Member State courts (or
ultimately, the Strasbourg Court). But instead it forged ahead into fundamental rights territory.
A moment’s reflection also reveals the breathtaking potential of the ERT decision.5 The
case arose in the context of an “economic” dispute concerning a Greek measure granting a radio
and TV broadcast monopoly to a single firm. Thus, it might at first seem to have little
importance outside of a limited range of economic regulatory measures. Anyone familiar with
the way the U.S. Supreme Court greatly expanded the reach of federal legislative power by
finding even the slightest and most indirect effect on interstate commerce to suffice (under the
2
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federal power to regulate interstate commerce)6 would nevertheless immediately see the
potential. For example, any infringement of the fundamental rights of a citizen from a different
Member State could be seen as discouraging travel (a worker or service freedom) to the
infringing Member State or as burdening the exercise of other economic freedoms that would
require presence in the infringing Member State. Indeed, although the logic is even more
indirect, the same could be said of a Member State measure that infringed the fundamental rights
of anyone present in the infringing Member State, including its own citizens, since that too could
discourage other Member State citizens from exercising their “acquis communautaire” rights
within that Member State.
Parallel U.S. Law—Supreme Court Incorporation of the Federal Bill of Rights into the
14th Amendment Due Process Clause to Control State Measures
There is a parallel development in U.S. constitutional history that may be instructive. In
the early part of the 20th century the U.S. Supreme Court enforced the Federal Bill of Rights (the
first ten amendments of the U.S. Constitution enacted along with the Constitution itself in 1789)
against federal government measures but not against State measures.7 Each State had its own
constitution and a system of State courts that enforced that State’s system of fundamental rights.
A federal-level system for protecting fundamental rights, however, was acutely lacking.
The Supreme Court gradually altered that system of limited federal-level fundamental
rights protection through a series of decisions starting in 1938 and still continuing to this day.8
On a case by case basis the Court has found that one after another of the Federal Bill of Rights
protections must be applied against the States through incorporation into the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment9 enacted at the end of the U.S. Civil War. The Due Process Clause
provides that “[no] State shall deny any person life, liberty, or property, without Due Process of
Law . . . .”10 Although “Due Process” evokes notions of procedural fairness, the Court found in
it a substantive meaning. The Court has ruled that the term includes those fundamental rights
that are of “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty”11 and that are “fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”12
This interpretation allowed the Court subsequently to rule that certain of the Federal Bill of
Rights applied against State measures because these rights constituted “fundamental principles of
liberty and justice.”
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Although the line of interpretation needed to achieve a similar result in the EU requires
perhaps more creativity, it has nevertheless beckoned to more than one Advocate General—as
we will see below. The equivalent parallel in the U.S. Constitutional structure would have called
for the U.S. Supreme Court to apply the Federal Bill of Rights against State measures that in
principle burdened interstate commerce and thus that had to pass muster under what in the U.S.
is called the “dormant commerce clause” analysis—a balancing test closely paralleling the EU
proportionality concept.13 Along with the dormant commerce clause analysis, the Supreme
Court could have slipped in Federal Bill of Rights scrutiny as well. But of course the 14th
Amendment Due Process Clause was a more direct route to that end—at least as long as one is
not daunted by giving a substantive meaning to language (“Due Process”) that carries a
procedural connotation.
ECJ Refusal to Extend ERT
The ECJ of course has no 14th Amendment at its disposal. On the other hand the ERT
case lays the necessary foundation for the ECJ to transform itself into a constitutional court
enforcing EU fundamental rights protections against Member State measures—at least if the ECJ
were willing to embark on a series of bold decisions extending the reach of the ERT holding. So
far it has been unwilling to do so.
Three years after ERT, Advocate General Jacobs advanced an extraordinarily broad view
of the ECJ’s role in reviewing Member State measures for conformity with fundamental rights.
In Konstantinidis,14 a Greek national who worked in Germany, claimed that official
mistranslation of his name had violated his worker freedom (because he had moved from Greece
to Germany to work) and his fundamental right of personal identity. Advocate General Jacobs
would have ruled in his favor, among other reasons, on the ground that every EU worker who
moves to another Member State for employment is entitled to the full protection of EU
fundamental rights—conceived of as a “common code of fundamental values” applying within
the EU.15 Note that this theory would still have left uncovered by the EU fundamental rights
umbrella EU citizens working in their home country—a gap that a later decision could have
filled.16 In fact, however, the ECJ was unwilling to embrace AG Jacobs’ theory and decided the
case without mentioning it.
Later in Kremzow17 the ECJ was more explicit in rejecting an expanded view of the ERT
theory. In Kremzow a former Austrian judge, serving a criminal sentence, sought ECJ scrutiny
of Austrian criminal procedure for breach of EU fundamental rights. He argued that because he
was unlawfully imprisoned in Austria he could not exercise his freedom to travel to another
Member State. The ECJ ruled that the defendant’s hypothetical right to exercise an EU
13
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economic freedom was too speculative to justify fundamental rights review of Member State
criminal procedure.18
Nevertheless, the ECJ continues to cite the ERT case and to apply its theory in cases that
arguably go beyond the facts of ERT itself, though perhaps not as far as Kremzov.19 For example
in Carpenter,20 the ECJ held that the UK could not deport the non-EU national wife of a UK
husband, who resided in the UK but exercised his EU freedom to provide services by traveling to
other Member States to sell advertisements in UK journals. The first stage “triggering” link,
bringing the case within the “scope of Community law,” was the UK measure’s infringement of
the husband’s freedom to provide services throughout the EU by denying him his wife’s
company on such trips. The ECJ did not limit itself to proportionality analysis, however, but
instead explicitly ruled—at what I have called a “second stage” analysis—that the UK measure
was inconsistent with the fundamental right of respect for family life within the meaning of
Article 8 of the ECHR.
Recently in Europa 721 Advocate General Poiares Maduro revisited the ERT issue and
proposed another theory for enlarging its reach, though not with the full exuberance of AG
Jacobs’ theory in Konstantinidis. The case involved a complaint against Italian administrative
authorities brought by an Italian broadcast company that had won national broadcasting rights in
a public tender procedure. Despite the public tender results, the Italian authorities failed to
allocate broadcasting frequencies to the successful Italian company because the number of
frequencies was limited and the Italian authorities allowed previous holders of the frequencies
(who had not succeeded in the public tender proceeding) to continue to use them. One claim was
that the action of the Italian authorities violated the EU fundamental right of freedom of
expression (in part because the broadcasters who continued to use the disputed frequencies held a
large number of broadcasting outlets in Italy). AG Maduro noted AG Jacobs’ expansive
jurisdictional theory in Konstantinidis and, without urging that it be adopted by the Court,
suggested a refinement of it by drawing on Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty of European Union
(TEU). Since the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, Article 6 of the TEU has provided as
follows:
18
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“(1) The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to
the Member States.
“(2) The Union shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . and as
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law.”
Article 7 of the TEU allows the Council and the Parliament to suspend certain rights
within the EU system of any Member State found responsible for a “serious and persistent”
breach of the Article 6(1) principles. In effect AG Maduro found a foothold in this TEU Article
7 language in arguing that the ECJ should subject Member State measures to fundamental rights
review only when they involve a serious and persistent breach of fundamental rights:
“Only serious and persistent violations which highlight a problem of systemic nature in
the protection of fundamental rights in the Member State at issue, would, in my view,
qualify as violations of the rules on free movement, by virtue of the direct threat they
would pose to the transnational dimension of European citizenship and to the integrity of
the EU legal order.” 22
Instead of relying on this ERT refinement,23 however, AG Maduro urged that the Centro
7 case be resolved on the basis that the actions of the Italian broadcasting authorities violated the
freedom of services provisions of Article 49 of the EC Treaty. The ECJ agreed without
mentioning the ERT theory. 24
Were AG Maduro’s theory ever adopted, however, it is not likely that the progression of
“refinements” in the theory would stop at the point he articulated. One could easily imagine a
series of later rulings that would eventually conform to AG Jacobs’ position in Konstantinidis.
The ECHR Alternative
Rather than look to the Luxembourg Court for fundamental rights review of Member
State measures, most commentators would probably see the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg [ECtHR] as the appropriate institution for this purpose.25 Nothing like the
innovative ERT theory is needed to establish the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. The ECHR and its
various protocols expressly provide for it. Moreover the Strasbourg Court has gained in prestige
and status in recent years, stemming in part from a number of developments, including (i) the
institutional reform that dropped the role of the former Human Rights Commission, which had
22
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served as a filter before cases could reach the Court; (ii) the gradual ratification by member
countries of the right of individual petition (between 1970 and the 1990’s);26 (iii) the enactment
of national statutes that enhance the ECHR’s role in national courts (and hence the Strasbourg
Court’s interpretations of the ECHR), such as the U.K.’s Human Rights Act and Ireland’s ECHR
Act; and (iv) the generally good record of government compliance with Strasbourg Court
rulings.27 Moreover the Lisbon Treaty—though unadopted as of this writing—requires the EU to
become a party to the ECHR, thus seeming to anoint the Strasbourg Court as the final arbiter of
fundamental rights in Europe.
At the same time, however, the ECHR regime suffers serious inadequacies as the primary
guarantor of uniform fundamental rights protection at the European level. For one thing recourse
to the Strasbourg Court is only possible after a claimant has exhausted all potential remedies at
the national level. National recourse is always a lengthy process, to which the further lengthy
process at the Strasbourg level must be added. As of January 1, 2009 there was a backlog of
approximately 97,300 applications pending on the Strasbourg Court’s docket.28 Many years will
thus have to elapse before a complainant’s claim can even be heard by the Strasbourg Court. To
deal with the backlog problem, Protocol 14 Bis allows a single judge on the Strasbourg Court to
decide that a case is inadmissible29—but this, of course, increases the risk that a claimant’s case
will in fact never be heard. Most important of all, a Strasbourg Court’s ruling—in contrast to an
ECJ ruling—has no direct effect within the legal system of a Member State.30 Thus, even when
a claimant succeeds before the Strasbourg Court, the final remedy (and its timing) depends
ultimately upon political considerations and processes within the respondent Member State. 31
The Imperative of an Efficacious European-Level Enforcement of Fundamental Rights
Thus, from an EU-wide viewpoint the current state of affairs concerning fundamental
rights enforcement against Member State measures entails the following dilemma: the ECtHR
has jurisdictional authority but to some extent lacks juridical efficacy, whereas, the ECJ is
empowered with juridical efficacy but lacks jurisdictional authority. If one reads U.S.
constitutional history as suggesting that a federalizing process impels the affected citizenry
toward a federal level guarantee of fundamental rights against government infringements at the
26
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sub-federal level—that is, a uniform articulation and guarantee of fundamental civil rights
throughout the polity—then one might predict that, in a mutually reinforcing pattern, pressure for
political unification in Europe may go hand-in-hand with further evolution of the fundamental
rights regime in Europe. That evolution might come in the form of treaty amendments providing
for a more efficacious Strasbourg regime, or in the form of case by case development by the ECJ
of the inherent potential of ERT, or in some as yet unanticipated form.
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